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Comparative cognition is the interdisciplinary study of nonhuman animal cognition. It has been 
criticized for systematically underattributing sophisticated cognition to nonhuman animals, a 
problem that I refer to as the underattribution bias. In this paper, I show that philosophical 
treatments of this bias at the experimental level have emphasized one feature of the 
experimental-statistical methodology (the preferential guarding against false positives over false 
negatives) at the expense of neglecting another feature (the default, or null, hypothesis). In order 
to eliminate this bias, I propose a reformulation of the standard statistical framework in 
comparative cognition. My proposal identifies and removes a problematic reliance on the value 
of parsimony in the calibration of the null hypothesis, replacing it with relevant empirical and 
theoretical information. In so doing, I illustrate how epistemic and non-epistemic values can 
covertly enter scientific methodology through features of statistical models, potentially biasing 
the products of scientific research. Broadly construed, this paper calls for increased 
philosophical attention to the experimental methodology and statistical choices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Comparative cognition is the interdisciplinary study of the evolution, development, and 
function of cognitive processes and mechanisms in nonhuman animals. A central controversy 
within the field concerns ways of guarding against bias in the course of interpreting nonhuman 
animal (henceforth, animal) behavior. As many philosophers and scientists have written, the 
worry is disproportionally aimed at guarding against overattribution of sophisticated cognition to 
animals (Sober 2005, Andrews 2011, de Waal 1998). For the purposes of this paper, I take it as a 
given that comparative cognition researchers as a group prefer explanations with the most 
austere cognitive ontologies, and that this practice results in an underattribution bias, or the 
systematic underascription of putatively complex cognition to animals (Andrews 2011, 
Fitzpatrick 2008, Meketa 2014). This preference is typically cashed out in terms of taking 
putatively simple mechanisms, processes, or abilities as the default experimental hypothesis. 
In this essay, I locate the mechanism that drives the underattribution bias within the choice 
of the statistical null hypothesis (H0). I argue that the manner in which the null hypothesis is 
currently chosen embeds a parsimony-based preference for simple cognitive ontologies. Having 
identified the mechanism driving the underattribution bias, I recommend removing that 
mechanism from the statistical methodology in which it is embedded, and replacing it with a 
procedure that is sensitive to empirical information. In so doing, I offer a case study of how 
values, such as parsimony, may come to play a central, though implicit, role in scientific 
methodology. 
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1. LOCATING THE SOURCE OF THE UNDERATTRIBUTION BIAS: THE NEYMAN-PEARSON 




In the case of comparative cognition, the dominant statistical analysis method is what is known 
as the Neyman-Pearson Method (NPM) of hypothesis testing. Although the NPM is not the only 
statistical system available to science – there are also Bayesian and likelihoodist methods – it is 
the orthodoxy in comparative psychology, and, by extension, in comparative cognition.1 The 
NPM includes what Peter Godfrey-Smith (1994) calls the error-rate asymmetry, which calls for 
preferring one type of hypothesis over another. Because the hypothesis typically preferred in 
comparative cognition is the one positing the simplest cognitive ontology, the error-rate 
asymmetry results in the underattribution bias. The remainder of this section explores the results 
of the error-rate asymmetry and sets the stage for my proposed solution for eliminating the 
underattribution bias. My solution works within the dominant paradigm of the NPM, retaining 
its desirable features, but offering a means of eliminating the parsimony-based underattribution 
bias. Put another way, my solution should be viewed as a reformation rather than as a revolution. 
What exactly is the NPM? Put simply, the NPM is a method for controlling the error- 
rates (long-run relative frequencies) of two types of errors, which are labeled Type I errors and 
Type II errors. Type I errors, in general, are defined as those that are most serious. In the 
Neyman-Pearson tradition, the assumption is that the most serious type of error is the one that 
rejects the null hypothesis (H0) when the H0 is true. Within this paradigm, accepting the H0 when 
 
 
1 For challenges to the orthodoxy of the NPM, see Kruschke (2010), who advocates replacing it 
with Bayesian analysis, and Anderson et al. (2000), who favor a version of likelihoodist methods 
to the allegedly “unscientific” null hypothesis testing methods. For philosophical defenses of the 
NPM, see Mayo (1981) and Mayo (1992). For a “severity-analysis” reformulation of the NPM 
see Mayo (2004) and Mayo and Spanos (2009, 2011). 
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it is false is a Type II error, and it is treated as less serious. Type I error rates are denoted as α and 
Type II error rates as β. To modify slightly Dienes’s (2008) formalization of the relationship 
between error types and their relative frequencies, we may say that 
α =def P(rejecting H0H0) 
β =def P(accepting H0¬H0). 
 
 
Although the NPM provides a means for controlling error rates in a way that minimizes the risk 
of making both types of errors, researchers have traditionally set the risk of a Type I errors lower 
than Type II errors. Typical values for α are .05, .01, and sometimes .001. Treating Type I errors 
as more serious translates into controlling for Type I errors by making α very small, while 
keeping β either large or not controlled at all. This preference for making Type II errors over 
Type I errors is the error-rate asymmetry. 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NULL HYPOTHESIS 
 
With this background complete, it is now possible to see how earlier assessments of the 
underattribution bias in comparative cognition have correctly located the source of the bias at 
the statistical level, but preferentially emphasized the error-rate asymmetry over what I will now 
argue is the real mechanism: the null hypothesis. 
Earlier Solutions: Locating the Underattribution Bias in the Error-Rate Asymmetry 
Elliott Sober (2001, 2005) argues that there is no reason to prefer making Type II errors over 
Type I errors in comparative cognition and that this preference is furthermore a misapplication 
of MC, understood as a parsimony principle. According to Sober, not only is MC not a 
parsimony principle, but both types of errors are equally undesirable, since both errors are
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equally wrong. Sober advocates ridding the field entirely of the error-rate asymmetry, arguing 
that, “the only prophylactic [against risk of error] is empiricism” (Sober 2005, 97). 
Building on Sober’s work, Andrews (2011) identifies the preference for Type I error with 
an exaggerated and damaging worry over the alleged systematic overattribution of sophisticated 
cognition to animals.2 She agrees with Sober that the matter is an empirical one, but departs 
from his conclusion regarding the seriousness of each type of error. She argues that Type I 
errors are in fact more damaging than Type II errors because they foreclose on the possibility of 
future research (Andrews 2011). On her view, preferring to make Type I errors means preferring 
to wrongly conclude that, e.g., the New Caledonian crows do not use planning to solve puzzles. 
Once such a judgment has been made, it no longer makes sense to ask further questions about 
the features of e.g., the crows’ future-planning abilities, such as whether they are domain-specific 
or general, available only with appropriate environmental scaffolding, and so on. As a result, a 
potentially fruitful research program never gets a chance to get off the ground. Type II errors,  
on the other hand, promote a further refinement of experimental questions. These questions 
may produce results that conflict with the original (mistaken) judgment, but, argues Andrews, 
science must be willing to take such risks. 
Moving to the Null Hypothesis 
 
Despite discussing the biasing effects of the error-rate asymmetry, neither Sober (2001, 2005) 
nor Andrews (2011) question the fact that the H0 is treated as the absence of the mental feature 
 
 
2 Andrews refers to this overattribution fear as the fear of so-called anthropomorphism, or the 
attribution of allegedly uniquely human cognitive complexity to nonhuman animals. For in- 
depth analyses of the alleged mistake of anthropomorphism, or the mistaken attribution of 
human properties to nonhuman entities, in comparative psychology, see Fisher (1990; 1991). See 
also Keeley (2004) for an update to Fisher’s arguments. 
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0 under investigation.
3 However, as I will now show, the choice of the H is just as likely to be a 
 
source of bias as the error-rate asymmetry. Once the H0 is understood to be a source of bias, a 
solution to the underattribution problem will become clear. 
 
Consider Andrews’s claim that the error-rate asymmetry results in what she calls a 
behavioristic bias. She is right as long as the H0 is defined as the absence of a cognitive feature. 
However, if the H0 were defined as the presence of rich cognitive abilities, the result would be the 
opposite of a bias toward underattribution: comparative cognition would be biased toward 
overattribution. Such a dramatic difference in the outcome of the application of our procedural 
rules points to the significance of the construction of the H0, i.e., the choice of how it is to be 
defined. If the construction of the H0 is so important to the final outcome of a given hypothesis- 
testing procedure, then we must pay more careful attention to how we come to identify 
something as the H0. 
To illustrate the importance of attending to the construction of the H0 more concretely, 
consider a case where replacing the H0 while retaining the error-rate asymmetry results in a bias 
toward sophisticated cognitive explanations. Let us take a closer look at an experiment by 
Allison Foote and Jonathom Crystal (2007), which used a duration-discrimination task to test for 
metacognition – awareness of one’s own mental states – among rats. In this case, the mental 
state in question was that of uncertainty. Meketa (2014) describes the experiment as follows: 
“[Rats] were presented with audio tones of different durations and trained to classify the 
tones into the categories of ‘‘short’’ or ‘‘long.’’ The rats were then presented with a range 
of tones, some clearly short and others ambiguous. Correct responses were rewarded 




3 Since the present essay was written, Andrews and Brian Huss have written, but, to my 
knowledge, not yet published a manuscript that includes an explicit discussion of the role of the 
null hypothesis (Andrews & Huss unpublished manuscript). 
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the same test, but were given a third option: to decline a test. Declined tests allowed the 
subjects to move on to more tests with the prospect of getting more food. When given 
the choice to decline tests, the rats consistently opted to decline the ambiguous 
(‘‘harder’’) tests but not the unambiguous tests, even though declining a test resulted in a 
smaller food reward than answering correctly. Moreover, the overall accuracy improved 
when rats were allowed to opt out of difficult tests. Foote and Crystal (2007) concluded 
that the rats were aware of their own uncertainty.” (Meketa 2014) 
In other words, Crystal and Foote concluded that this behavior showed that the rats were 
metacognitive. 
Let us now abstract away from the details of the experimental setup and just consider the 
hypothesis being tested. We see that their H0 was that the rats do not possess metacognition. The 
alternative hypothesis – the one they wished to demonstrate – was that the rats are capable of 
metacognition.  Given the error-rate asymmetry, the burden of proof falls on the metacognitive 
hypothesis. In fact, in a follow-up paper on metacognition, Crystal and Foote (2009) clearly state 
that the default hypothesis – the H0 – is and should be that rats lack metacognitive capacities. The 
reason, they argue, is that the behaviors they observed in the 2007 trials could be explained by 
 
allegedly simpler mechanisms, such as associative learning, which is presumed to be 
incompatible with metacognition.4 This means that the metacognitive explanations bear the 
burden of proof. 
But now consider what would happen if the H0 in Foote and Crystal’s experiments were 
a rich cognitive explanation of the rats’ behavior (e.g., H0 = “rats are capable of metacognition”). 
 
 
4 The standard view that associative mechanisms are different from and simpler than cognitive 
processes has been coming under scrutiny in recent years. For example, Cameron Buckner 
(2012) argues against the view that cognitive and associative systems are incompatible. Taking 
issue with the assumption that association is simple, Gallistel (2008) argues that associative 
mechanisms are more demanding than cognitive systems insofar as they would require far 
greater energy expenditures than alternative mechanisms. He uses the honeybee navigation 
system to argue that the honeybee brain does not have enough computing power to process 
information through associations alone, and must require a representational system of mental 
maps (Gallistel 2008). 
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Then the burden of proof would be on the hypotheses positing less sophisticated cognition (e.g., 
H1 = “rats are relying on stimulus-response learning”). In this case, a preference for Type I 
errors over Type II errors would mean a preference for accepting (or failing to reject) the 
hypothesis that rats possess metacognitive abilities when, in fact, the rats do not. As a result, the 
underattribution bias would be inverted. 
The metacognition example suggests that the way that the H0 is constructed is at least as 
important as the error-rate asymmetry when it comes to assessing an experimental methodology 
for built-in theoretical commitments. What attending to the construction of the H0 reveals is 
that, while the asymmetry introduces a bias, the nature of this bias is specified by the content of 
the H0. In one sense, the role of the H0 may be more important than the error-rate asymmetry: 
while the asymmetry can only be made more or less pronounced, the content of the H0 can 
 
embed any number of problematic assumptions. 
 
This conclusion prompts the question: Why, if the content of H0 is so important, have 
scientists and philosophers of science assumed that the H0 is naturally defined as “non-presence” 
or “no effect”? It is curious that a feature that carries such powerful implications for inference 
from experiment should be casually assumed to be globally fixed at the non-presence of the 
target cognitive property. In order to explain why the content of the H0 has been systematically 
overlooked, I turn to Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (1994) analysis of the NPM and the possible 
justifications for its use. Placing the NPM into its historical context will, furthermore, motivate 
my suggestion that the NPM can be modified as I suggest in §5. 
 
3. THE NPM: A CHANGING JUSTIFICATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF PARSIMONY 
According to Godfrey-Smith (1994), the original justification for the NPM was pragmatic, but 
that justification was rejected shortly after its introduction while the method of preferentially 
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controlling for Type I errors was retained. Contrary to Andrews’s claim, the original NPM 
included an accept/reject procedure. However, the original, pragmatic, justification of the 
‘accept/reject’ decision-procedure was intended as a behavioral strategy, where “accepting” an 
hypothesis meant acting as if the hypothesis were true (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 280-82). This 
pragmatic justification meant that the NPM could not be used to support belief in the truth of an 
hypothesis or even in the probability of the hypothesis being true. This pragmatic justification did 
not sit well with subsequent scientists and statisticians (e.g., R.A. Fisher), who wanted a statistical 
system to provide evidence for the truth or falsity of an hypothesis – something that the original 
NPM explicitly avoided (Dienes 2008, Anderson et al., 2000, Gigerenzer 2004). The result, 
according to Godfrey-Smith, was a proliferation of alternative justifications that have in turn 
altered the method in unexpected ways. 
One alternative justification – which Godfrey-Smith labels the ‘semantic’ justification5 – 
includes the concept of what he calls a ‘natural null,’ or Hn, which is typically defined as the 
hypothesis of no effect or no difference. On the semantic justification, the Type I error is a 
wrong rejection of the hypothesis of no effect, or no difference. Since Type I errors are 
considered more serious, the semantic justification advises erring on the side of concluding that 
no effect or difference was detected. Moreover, the accept/reject procedure is interpreted both 
behaviorally and epistemically (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 287). I wish to focus on what Godfrey- 
Smith calls the ‘semantic’ justification for the NPM, because this is the most popular justification 
in psychology and, hence, also in comparative psychology and comparative cognition. It is worth 
noting that the other two justifications that Godfrey-Smith discusses, the ‘pragmatic’ and the 
‘doxastic,’ do not specify a value for the H0, holding that “H0 is ‘true’ if the world is in a state 
5 Godfrey-Smith labels justification as “semantic” because it specifies the semantic content of 
the null. 
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such that the action associated with H0 is better than the alternative action” (Godfrey-Smith 
1994, 281).6 
Crucially, Godfrey-Smith identifies a curious metaphysical principle embedded in the 
semantic NPM: When combined with the error-rate asymmetry, the Hn results in a preference 
for nothing over something, that is an Occamist commitment to maximally simple ontologies and 
theories that favor such ontologies. Since the semantic justification is, according to Godfrey- 
 
Smith’s analysis, the most common interpretation in science – sometimes combined with the 
doxastic justification – it follows that the sciences that use it encode a commitment to Occamist 
metaphysics. Godfrey-Smith argues that psychology uses the semantic justification almost 
exclusively, though this is sometimes combined with a doxastic justification. Since comparative 
cognition is to a large extent constituted by comparative psychology, it is no surprise that 
Occamism is present in comparative cognition’s statistical methodology as well. 
Finally, if indeed the content of the H0 is at least as significant as the error-rate 
asymmetry for identifying bias in comparative cognition, then Sober and Andrews have been 
focusing on a feature that only becomes a problem under conditions in which the null 
hypothesis is biased. It is possible to retain the asymmetry found in the NPM without accepting 
the question-begging conservatism about animal minds. My analysis recommends that the 






6 By contrast with this behavioral “pragmatic” interpretation, the doxastic justification for the 
NPM is epistemic. It replaces the pragmatic component with the rule that “when an observation 
in the critical region [the set of values that would cause us to reject the hypothesis] occurs the 
researcher rejects H0. But when an observation falls outside the critical region the researcher 
merely suspends judgment” (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 282; emphasis added). 
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It is evident that statistical methods are often considered value-neutral and, in that 
respect, objective. However, I have shown that values may be embedded in these statistical 
methods. In the case of comparative cognition, this value is Occamist parsimony, and it is 
located in the choice of the null hypothesis within the NPM. Moreover, as a statistical 
methodology comes to be used as a standard in a given field, the values embedded in the method 
fade from scientific consciousness. The result is that, while researchers and philosophers 
appreciate the potential for a gerrymandering of data by cherry-picking statistical analyses, values, 
such as parsimony, continue to operate in the background methodology itself, without         
being subject to direct scrutiny. Analyses such as the one I offer here, are, therefore, crucial for 
uncovering and assessing the effects of values even in such inconspicuous places as tools for 
statistical analysis of experimental data. So much for a partial account of the invisibility of the 
null in the philosophy and science of comparative cognition. The next question is how the 
underattribution bias may be corrected. Given that comparative cognition researchers are 
unlikely to abandon the NPM in the near future, I propose a reformation of the semantic NPM. 
4. THE NPM REFORMED: REPLACING THE NATURAL NULL WITH A CONTEXTUAL NULL 
 
I have argued that the underattribution bias is driven by a parsimony-based preference for 
purportedly simple cognitive ontologies, and that this practice is regimented in the preference  
for a Hn. I will now show how to alter the “semantic” NPM in a manner that eliminates this bias. 
My strategy involves modifying the semantic NPM to replace the natural null with what I call a 
 
“contextual null” (Hc), which reflects a broader epistemic context for the animals under 
investigation. 
 
To begin, note that the semantic view does not require that the H0 must always be that 
the feature under investigation is absent. It is, however, this particular definition that lends the 
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semantic view its bias toward Occamist parsimony. It follows that removing the Occamism from 
the semantic NPM requires removing the natural null. This is precisely what I now suggest: the 
natural null should be replaced with a contextual null. In contrast to the Hn, the Hc is defined 
against a suite of background information about the research subjects, such as ontogenetic and 
 
phylogenetic information against the background of developmental and evolutionary theories, 
information about species-typical and individual behavioral profiles, neuroanatomical 
homologies7 and homoplasies,8 ecological context, and information from earlier studies and 
observational data.9 I call such a null “contextual” for two reasons: (1) it respects the differences 
among experimental settings and the organisms being studied, and (2) it does not presuppose 
either cognitive complexity or cognitive simplicity. It is sensitive to the changing conditions 
between experiments, both in terms of the kinds of questions that are asked and with respect to 
how much is known about the target system. 
The evolutionary considerations that I propose to be taken into account in constructing 
the Hc include the species’ phylogenetic proximity to species about whom more is known in 
order to gauge the likelihood of homologous cognitive structures and abilities. These 
considerations already enter into decisions about which species to study when searching for a 
given ability, but not into the decision to cast a given hypothesis as the presumptive null. For 
example, chimpanzees’ close phylogenetic proximity to humans is a frequently cited reason to 
test them for the presence of human-like abilities, such as tool use and metacognition. 
 
 
7 A homology is “a similarity inherited from a common ancestor” (Sober 2005, 94). 
8 A homoplasy is “a similarity that is the result of two or more independent derivations of the 
trait” (ibid). 
9 Fitzpatrick (2008) draws a very similar conclusion about the need for background information 
in hypothesis testing. However, he does not frame his case in statistical terms. His account is 
intended to displace the parsimony-based reading of Morgan’s canon, understood as a heuristic, 
with a principle he calls “Evidentialism.” 
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The developmental considerations relevant to constructing the Hc include, inter alia, 
hypotheses regarding developmental constraints on the evolution of the relevant cognitive and 
behavioral traits and the effects of the environment on gene expression. Ecological context 
would include information about the test subjects’ behavior in its natural habitat, such as 
whether it is a social or solitary animal, whether it hunts or stores its food, whether it uses tools, 
and so on. Once again, these considerations already drive the research projects, suggesting that 
researchers consider such information to be probability-conferring. Consider the following 
example of research that has been guided by both ecological and developmental considerations. 
Furlong et al. (2008) tested chimpanzees for their ability to use tools based on the knowledge 
that chimpanzees use tools under natural conditions (e.g., dipping sticks into ant mounds to 
catch ants; using leaves to scoop up water). Based on the negative results obtained by a previous 
study by Daniel Povinelli (2000), which concluded that chimpanzees lack the competency for 
flexible use of implements, Furlong et al. hypothesized that Povinelli’s chimps were 
developmentally stunted as a result of being brought up under socially impoverished conditions. 
Furlong et al. tested chimpanzees with different socialization backgrounds, and found that the 
ability to manipulate tools in a flexible manner (i.e., one suggestive of causal understanding) was 
positively correlated with social histories. This example shows the value of social ecology and its 
effects on chimpanzee intellectual development. Building such considerations into the null 
hypothesis would ensure that crucial information is not left out of the experimental design. 
Finally, the Hc should include information from previous studies and observational data. 
 
However, given the arguments of the foregoing sections, including the work of earlier 
experimental studies would require re-evaluating them for the presence of bias. This can be 
achieved by analyzing the choice of null hypothesis to ensure that unwarranted metaphysical 
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preferences have not been smuggled in and that relevant empirical and theoretical information 
was included. 
The upshot is that my proposed Hc ensures that Type I errors will always be more 
epistemically serious because probability-conferring evidence is built into the H0. Sometimes this 
method will produce a H0 positing a simple cognitive ontology, but this will no longer be based 
on a blanket Occamist preference for simple ontologies, but on an empirically-informed 
expectation. This suggestion respects the intuition that default hypotheses ought to be those that 
we have the best reason to adopt. In the end, my account preserves the risk-controlling structure 
of the semantic account of the NPM while eliminating the questionable metaphysics and 
replacing it with empirical information. 
CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that earlier assessments of bias in comparative cognition at the level of statistical 
data evaluation have ignored an important feature of the orthodox NPM –namely the null 
hypothesis. I have suggested that this lacuna may be attributed to a specific interpretation of the 
NPM – the semantic justification – which assumes that the null hypothesis must be universally 
set to a natural null of “no difference” or “no effect.” I have suggested that if the semantic 
version of the NPM commits the researcher to a position supported only by a problematic 
Occamist metaphysics, then the semantic version needs to be modified. My proposed 
modification to the NMP maintains the error-rate asymmetry, but replaces the Hn with the Hc. 
This change respects the intuition that the burden of proof should be on the hypothesis that has 
 
the least empirical and theoretical evidence on its side. 
At a more general level, the foregoing discussion provides a case study of how 
metaphysical assumptions, such as a preference for simple ontologies, can enter science at the 
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level of statistical model choice. The fact that such metaphysical assumptions can be grafted 
onto the standard statistical models of an entire field suggests the need for a more careful 
scrutiny of statistical models, as philosophers of statistics, such as Deborah Mayo have been 
arguing for years. I showed that the data processing instruments used to generate inferences may 
not be value-free. Whether a value-free statistical instrument is desirable is an open question, but 
recognizing its value-laden dimensions is a necessary step in evaluating the conclusions drawn 
from scientific experiments. 
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